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This paper presents new evidence on the relationship between corruption and income 
inequality. Using a panel data methodology, we find that lower corruption is associated with 
higher income inequality in Latin America. This result is in contrast to other empirical studies 
but it makes sense in Latin America for a number of reasons. The finding of an inverse 
relationship between inequality and corruption suggests that institutional reform policies by 
themselves may be misguided. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption and income inequality have been symbols of Latin America since colonial times.  
During the colonial period profitable activities were controlled by a privileged few and, to 
protect their interests, institutions were structured in such a manner that the majority of the 
population were denied access to land, education and political power (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2002). Following independence the Creole elite gained 
control of key institutions and were able to wield significant influence on the formation and 
implementation of government policies.
1 In more recent times the emphasis has switched to 
greater government transparency and good governance, which can be seen in the second 
generation reforms.
2 Furthermore, surveys of public opinion highlight corruption as a major 
problem facing the region (Lagos, 2003) and for many it has become the common 
denominator explaining all of the region’s woes, including inequality.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between corruption and inequality in 
Latin America. This research is timely and important for two reasons. First, little is known 
empirically about the link between corruption and inequality in the region even though the 
two are perceived to be closely connected. Moreover, the nature of the inequality-corruption 
relationship has important policy implications. Second, the conventional view, based on 
empirical work in other parts of the world, suggests that corruption and inequality are 
positively related. However, Chong and Calderón (2000) find a non-monotonic relationship 
between corruption and inequality in a cross sectional study of many (rich and poor) 
countries. For the poorer countries in their sample lower corruption is associated with higher 
inequality. They suggest that the presence of a large informal sector in some countries may be 
the reason for this. Since the informal sector in many Latin American countries is relatively 
large, and since there is a focus on institutional reform, the region is ideal for exploring 
further the finding of Chong and Calderón.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. The 
empirical model and data issues are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 the empirical results 
are presented and discussed. Section 5 reports some robustness tests and Section 6 concludes. 
                                         
1 One example is the failure to invest in public education which helped to protect the vested interests of the elite 
group. 
2 It has been suggested that international organisations have attempted to de-politicise corruption by adopting 
terminology such as good governance and transparency.   3
 
2. Literature Review 
The empirical and theoretical literature on the link between corruption and income inequality, 
when taken together, is inconclusive with regard to the relationship between inequality and 
corruption. Much of the empirical literature reports a positive relationship – more corruption 
is associated with higher inequality (e.g., Mauro, 1995, 1997; Gupta et al., 1998; Fisman and 
Svensson, 2000; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002, Gyimah-Brempong and De Camancho, 2006). 
The argument made to support the empirical finding is as follows. Corruption, in the form of 
tax evasions and exemptions, reduces funds for social programmes, including education and 
health. Further, since the beneficiaries of tax evasion and exemptions are more likely to be the 
relatively wealthy, the tax burden falls almost exclusively on the poor, making the effective 
tax system regressive. The impact on social programmes can be direct as funds may be 
siphoned out of poverty alleviation programmes in order to extend benefits to relatively 
wealthy population groups. Even when social programmes are not reduced, corruption may 
change the composition of social spending in a manner that benefits the rich at the expense of 
the poor; for example, expenditure on tertiary rather primary education. In a corrupt system, 
the allocation of public procurement contracts may lead to inferior public infrastructure, 
which also has implications for welfare and inequality. In sum, corruption favours higher 
income groups and so promotes greater inequality.  
  
In contrast to the above, Chong and Calderón (2000) find a quadratic relationship between 
corruption and inequality for a cross section of rich and poor countries. For poor countries in 
the sample they observe that a fall in corruption (measured by institutional quality) is 
associated with a rise in income inequality. They explain the finding for poor countries in 
relation to the informal sector. In many poor countries the informal sector is relatively large 
and its members are among the poorest. It is the main source of income to the poor who 
cannot find jobs in the formal sector because of their personal characteristics, institutional 
barriers or labour market discrimination. Institutional reform and formalisation generate 
additional costs on members of the informal sector via improvements in tax collection, 
imposition of new taxes, new regulations, bureaucratic requirements and policing.
3 They add 
that reform may also directly affect the mechanism by which the informal sector carries out 
                                         
3 Taxes on formal firms constitute a major source of government revenues, especially in developing countries. 
Regulation refers to environmental protection, consumer protection, quality control, workers’ welfare etc.   4
transactions. Hence, mechanisms that make the informal sector work are no longer useful and 
new ones will have to be learned. Since the informal sector mostly employs those in the 
lowest quintile of the income distribution, a rise in institutional quality is likely to be 
translated into a fall in the absolute and relative income of this group.   
  
Chong and Calderon also say that those poor countries with high inequality and high 
corruption may become trapped in inequality regardless of the development of their 
institutions. For poor countries close to the inflection point, however, institutional 
development and formalisation may promote lower inequality. With formalisation business 
will be able to take full advantage of government services, including skills-training 
programmes and government sponsored activities. Firms will also be able to exercise all 
property rights over their capital and product, and contracts can be enforced. Being formal 
means that firms do not have to hide and operate on a scaled down capacity, instead they can 
increase production and enjoy economies of scale. Thus, if the main reason for going informal 
is the lack of services (Dabla-Norris et al., 2005), formalisation will allow business to take 
advantages of all such services which can lead to increased productivity and efficiency, 
business expansion, job creation and declining levels of inequality.  
 
Some of the theoretical literature predicts a positive relationship between corruption (defined 
in various ways) and inequality. Gleaser et al. (2003), for example, develop a model of 
judicial corruption and show that weak institutions allow only those who are able to protect 
themselves to become rich. Other researchers have shown that causation can run both ways: 
inequality encourages the under-development of institutions, which in turn leads to more 
inequality (e.g., Sonin, 2003; Chong and Gradstein, 2007). Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), 
however, predict a non-monotonic relationship between democracy (a proxy for corruption) 
and inequality. They develop a political economy growth model in which public decisions are 
initially made only by the educated minority. The (educated) voting minority therefore runs 
the country and initially inequality rises. In order to achieve higher growth, less educated 
persons are schooled and the proportion of educated citizens rises. The political power of the 
old elite thus becomes diluted as the decision making group grows and becomes more diverse. 
Subsequently, redistribution policies will grow in number and inequality will fall.
4  
                                                                                                                               
Bureaucratic requirements pertain to a firms having accountants and lawyers. All of these will increases the 
operational costs of a business.
 
4 This has been termed a political Kuznets curve. See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).   5
 
The formal analysis of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) shows that in developing countries large 
public projects aimed at reducing income inequality create more opportunities for corruption 
(via things like tax loopholes and corruption in the allocation of public projects). Their model 
indicates that the most well meaning of policy makers will not cut large public projects, even 
though doing so would reduce the scope for corruption, because the cost of corruption is 
worth paying, as it is often the only way to improve the condition of the poor. In other words, 
there may well be a trade-off between corruption and inequality. Blackburn and Forgues-
Puccio (2009) suggest that corruption may be less harmful in countries where corruption is 
well organised. Their model shows that if bureaucrats are organised and act as a de facto joint 
monopoly, negative externalities arising from non-coordinated, individual rent-seeking 
behaviour are internalised. Individuals no longer engage in numerous separate bilateral bribe 
negotiations with different government officials. Furthermore, the uncertainty associated with 
bribery is reduced, as payments are transparent and predictable. Better organised corruption 
can lead to a greater provision of government goods, which helps to improve the welfare of 
the poorest. Mandal and Marjit (2010) consider the impact of corruption on wage inequality. 
Their model assumes a small open economy with competitive markets where two goods are 
produced using three factors of production. The model predicts that the impact on both 
relative and absolute wages is ambiguous following a decline in the degree of corruption.  
 
The above discussion indicates that the relationship between corruption and inequality is 
inconclusive. Though numerous empirical studies have found that a fall in corruption reduces 
income inequality, there is also evidence suggesting that the inequality-corruption relationship 
is non-monotonic, with lower corruption being associated with higher inequality in poor 
countries. Furthermore, some of the theoretical literature predicts an inverse relationship 
between corruption and inequality. Many countries in Latin America have a large informal 
sector and high levels of corruption and inequality. Institutional reform and formalisation will 
likely weaken the informal sector with adverse consequences for its members who are among 
the poorest. While formalisation may bring benefits over time that lead to lower inequality, 
countries with initially high inequality and high corruption may become trapped in inequality.  
 
3. Model Specification and Data 
Econometric estimation is conducted using four-year panel data over the period 1982-2002   6
for 19 Latin American countries,
5 with each observation of the dependent variable being the 
relevant four year average value. There are some missing observations in the data so the panel 
is unbalanced. A priori, a fixed effects model is preferred to a random effects model since we 
expect the explanatory variables to be correlated with the unobserved individual effects. The 
specification of the general model is similar to that in previous empirical research (e.g., Barro, 
2000; Lundberg and Squire, 2003): 
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where  i η is the country-specific fixed effect, γis are coefficients to be estimated, eit is the 
stochastic error term, i and t index countries and years respectively, and other variables are 
defined as follows. The dependent variable (Gini) is a standard measure of income inequality, 
the Gini coefficient. The data on inequality is drawn from the United Nations World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) (UNU-WIDER, 2005).
6 We use the new quality label provided in 
Version 2a of the WIID, which combines and improves the quality ratings in Deininger and 
Squire (1996) with older versions of the WIID. Data classified as the lowest quality is 
excluded. Furthermore, only data which covers the entire population is used. Gini coefficients 
are based on income rather than consumption because of data constraints.
7 In a manner 
similar to others, we include dummy variables to control for the survey unit and the definition 
of income.
8 For each country, we have formed the longest possible series of observations. 
 
                                         
5 The countries included in the sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
6 Available on http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. 
7 One limitation of the income based measure is an upward bias in the Gini coefficient since 
individuals/households can smooth their consumption via borrowing, in spite of fluctuating income. 
Furthermore, in Latin American countries the large informal sector means an underreporting of income. This will 
amplify the Gini coefficient, hence one may believe that inequality is worse than it actually is.  
8 Ginis based on the individual are expected to be higher than those based on the household because there is a 
tendency for poorer households to be larger than richer ones. Also, households are in a better position to make 
adjustments to expenditure patterns than individuals. With progressive tax systems, the Gini coefficient based on 
net income is expected to be lower than that based on gross income.     7
The corruption measure (corrupt) is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption 
index. It is intended to capture the likelihood that high level government officials will demand 
special payments and the extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout lower 
levels of government (Knack and Keefer, 1995).
9 The ICRG measure has the advantage of 
having the broadest coverage for Latin American countries for the study period. It takes 
values from zero (most corrupt) to six (least corrupt). The natural logarithm of real output per 
capita (lgdp) and natural logarithm of real output per capita squared (lgdp
2) are included in the 
model to test the classical Kuznets hypothesis (Kuznets, 1955; Lewis, 1954). In line with 
other studies (e.g., Bourguignon and Morrison, 1998; Li et al., 1998; Alderson and Nielsen, 
1999; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000; Morley, 2000; Gupta et al., 2002; Reuveny and Li, 
2003; Breen and García-Peñalosa, 2005; Albanesi, 2007) the model includes the following 
variables: primary (primary) and secondary (secondary) gross school enrolment rates, the 
share of agriculture in total output (aggdp), openness of the economy (trade), and financial 
development (measured as the ratio of broad money to output (m2gdp) or domestic credit to 
the private sector (dcps)). Other variables included are the distribution of land resources 
(land), foreign direct investment (fdi), inflation (inflation), the concentration of natural 
resources (natres), privatisation (priv) and interaction terms. Data for all these variables is 
taken from the Penn World Table, Version 6.2
10 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002), World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2003) and Frankema (2005). 
 
In panel data models it is assumed that the errors are uncorrelated and homoskedastic. It is 
possible that these assumptions will not hold because the sample has both cross sectional and 
time-series elements. Therefore, tests for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, as 
discussed in Woolridge (2002), are undertaken. Depending on the diagnostics, the model is 
re-estimated allowing for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity or both. Another important 
issue in estimating equation (1) is the endogeneity of the control variables (in particular the 
corruption variable). Incorporating time invariant fixed effects into the model addresses this 
issue to some extent, but the inclusion of time varying factors means omitted variable bias is 
still a potential problem. Furthermore, if there is correlation between at least one explanatory 
                                         
9 Lambsdorff (2006) cautions that this index does not measure a country’s level of corruption but the political 
risk involved in corruption. However, the ICRG index has been widely used to measure corruption (e.g., Clague, 
1997; Chong and Calderón, 2000; Fisman and Gatti, 2002).  
10 Available on http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php.   8
variable and the error term, OLS estimates will suffer from simultaneity bias.
11 One way to 
potentially deal with these problems is to do instrumental variable (IV) estimation.  
 
In the literature on inequality, numerous instruments for corruption have been used. These 
include a black market premium, financial development, government spending on defence as 
a percentage of GDP, democracy, latitude of a country, ratio of government spending to GDP, 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and mortality rate of colonial settlers. It is difficult to justify 
instruments such as financial development and black market premium as they may have a 
direct impact on inequality (e.g., Barro, 2000; Morley, 2001; Lundberg and Squire, 2003; 
Gourdon et al., 2008), while spending on defense diverts resources away from education and 
health. The mortality rate of colonial settlers and latitude are not appropriate for this study 
since we use panel data rather than pure cross-sectional data. While ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation may be a valid instrument for corruption in a growth equation, it is 
unsuitable in an inequality regression (Mauro, 1995).
12 The use of democracy as an 
instrument is problematic since it is likely that a more equal distribution of political rights in 
the form of democracy leads to a more equal income distribution (e.g. Gradstein et al., 2001; 
Reuveny and Li, 2003). Perhaps the only reasonable instrument is the ratio of government 
spending to GDP but this may be problematic as countries with the largest ratios tend to be 
the least corrupt.
13 Given the weaknesses with potential instruments, we decided to reject IV 
estimation in favour of a model with lagged explanatory variables.  
 
Table 1 shows the four-year average values for the Gini coefficient. Inequality increased 
steadily over the period for the region as a whole. There is evidence of variation across 
individual countries and variation over different time periods. For example, while countries 
like Panama and Paraguay saw marked increases in the Gini coefficient over the period, 
others like Costa Rica and Uruguay saw more modest rises. No country experienced a large 
reduction in inequality over the period as a whole. Table 2 presents four year averages for the 
corruption index. The average value of the index for Latin America as a whole has increased 
over the study period (corruption levels have fallen), though there is some variation to this 
                                         
11 Many researchers discuss the channels through which inequality affects corruption (e.g Jong-Sung & 
Khagram, 2005; Uslander, 2006). 
12 In any event we do not have data on this variable for all four-year averages. 
13 Dynamic panel estimation would be an ideal procedure to adopt given the lack of suitable instruments. 
However, missing observations and the fact that the Arellano-Bond method involves differencing the variables 
and using lags as instruments, would leave us with too few observations.   9
pattern across countries. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the Gini coefficient and the 
corruption index.  
 
4. Empirical Results  
The results from estimating (1) are reported in Table 3. Several different specifications are 
shown in columns (1) to (4). For the OLS estimates, a Hausman test rejects the random effects 
model in favour of the fixed effects model. Along with the fixed effects, the explanatory 
variables account for more that 50 per cent of the variation in income inequality across 
countries.  
 
The sign on the coefficient corrupt is positive in column (1). A positive coefficient is also 
found in alternative model specifications as indicated in the other columns of Table 3.
14 This 
result is particularly interesting as it indicates that lower corruption (a rise in the corruption 
index) is associated with a rise in the Gini coefficient. In other words, there is a trade-off 
between corruption and inequality. Though at odds with empirical results outside of Latin 
America, this finding is consistent with the findings in some of the literature discussed in 
Section 2. Moreover, the finding is not surprising given the potential impact of institutional 
reform in countries with a relatively large informal sector. The informal sector in many Latin 
American countries accounts for 25-30 per cent of aggregate output and provides employment 
for more than 50 per cent of the urban workforce.
15 Tokman (2007) notes that out of every 
100 jobs created since 1980, 60 have been informal ones.
16 Therefore, a move to 
formalisation will have a significant impact on employment and cause relatively large losses 
for low income groups. In Peru, for example, Tokman (2001) shows that formalisation could 
lead to a 50 per cent cut in profits for 75 per cent of enterprises. The adverse employment 
effect is compounded because informal workers are largely poor with little or no education or 
experience (Freije, 2002).  
 
Turning to other results in Table 3, there is no support for the Kuznets hypothesis as the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant and have incorrect signs. This finding is in line with 
                                         
14 We also tested for the presence of a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and inequality (political 
Kuznets curve) by including a squared term for the corruption variable. It was not significant.   
15 According to Maloney (2004) the informal sector includes 30-70 per cent of urban workers in Latin America. 
16 This is true even for Chile (South America’s most stable economy) over the first half of the 1990s, where 90 
per cent of all jobs originated in the informal sector. In Peru, the economy would have to grow by 7 per cent   10
the findings of others, including Ravallion (1995), Deininger and Squire (1988), Odekokun 
and Round (2004), and Angeles (2007). Indeed, Fields and Jakubson (1994) show that the 
estimated curve can go from inverted U-shaped to U-shaped when allowing for fixed effects. 
The coefficients on primary reflect the widely accepted view that a rise in primary school 
education serves to reduce income inequality (e.g., Tinbergen, 1975; Sylwester, 2002; Chu, 
2000). The positive coefficient on secondary suggests that a higher level of secondary 
education worsens inequality. This finding may be a reflection of the fact that education 
above the primary school level remains largely a privilege. A natural solution is the 
introduction of an education strategy which achieves a significant leap in both participation 
rates and quality across the school system, and in particular at the secondary school level.  
 
The coefficient on financial development defined as either the domestic credit to the private 
sector or the ratio of broad money to GDP is statistically significant and positive, which 
means that as the financial sector develops inequality rises. Similar results were found by 
Morley (2000), who noted that while the positive sign does not concur with the theory, it 
supports the assertion that inequality in the region widened after the implementation of 
reforms (Berry, 1998; Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). Openness, defined as the trade ratio
17, also 
exacerbates inequality. Similar results have been reported by several researchers and there are 
many channels through which the impact occurs (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004). In line with 
the findings of Odekokun and Round (2004) and Angeles (2007), our results suggest that the 
concentration of land exacerbates the income inequality problem in the region.  
 
Although the agriculture variable has the expected sign, it is not significant. Neither inflation 
nor resource abundance (defined as the share of ores and mineral as a percent of merchandise 
exports) is significant. Foreign direct investment is marginally significant and privatisation 
(cumulative value of the sales and transfers of companies as a proportion of GDP) is only 
significant when included with an interaction term. Two of the interaction terms 
(corruption*trade and corruption*privatisation in columns 3 and 4, respectively) are 
                                                                                                                               
each year to accommodate the demand for jobs. Venezuela’s informal sector accounts for more than half the 
workforce despite being an oil rich economy that once boasted of Latin America’s highest GDP per capita. 
17 Other measures of openness were also investigated, including the Sachs and Warner openness index and the 
average tariff rate.    11
significant and have opposite signs to the corruption variable. This may suggest that more 
liberal polices reduce the impact of corruption on inequality (see Section 5 below).
18 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
As an alternative to the Gini coefficient, we use the share of income in the lowest quintile as 
the dependent variable (Quintile1). Table 4 shows that a rise in the corruption index decreases 
the share of income in the lowest quintile. In other words, as corruption falls inequality 
worsens. This result is consistent with the finding in Table 3. A similar result is obtained 
using alternative specifications (columns (2)-(4) of Table 4). Table 4 also shows that there are 
some differences with respect to other explanatory variables in the model. Foreign direct 
investment, natural resource endowment and privatisation have a negative impact on the share 
of income in the lowest quintile. When the latter variables are included the trade ratio and 
secondary schooling becomes insignificant (column (2)) and their performance improves once 
these variables are omitted (column (3)). The agriculture variable is significant and positive 
meaning that as the share of agriculture in GDP increases, the share of income to the lowest 
quintile rises (inequality falls). In contrast to the results in Table 3, none of the interaction 
terms are significant. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the model with lagged explanatory variables.
19 The results for the 
corruption variable are consistent with those above (positive sign in the case of the Gini 
coefficient and a negative sign in the case of Quintile 1). The agriculture variable (column 2) 
is marginally significant and negative (a rise in the share of agriculture lowers inequality) 
which is consistent with the result obtained when the dependent variable is Quintile 1. Results 
for the interactions terms are not reported as they are statistically insignificant. Table 6 reports 
results using an adjusted version of the Gini coefficient. As the Gini coefficient is bounded 
between 0 and 100, OLS may be problematic since it assumes that the dependent variable is 
unbounded. In order to overcome this potential problem, the dependent variable is 
transformed using the formula log [Gini/(100-Gini)] to become unbounded. Table 6 reveals 
no marked difference in the results.  
                                         
18 We also included other interaction terms that have been used in the literature such as natural resource 
abundance*corruption, openness*natural resource abundance, and openness*secondary (see Perry and 
Olarreaga, 2006). 
19 The variables are lagged one period. Any further lags would result in too few degrees of freedom. The lagged 
values can be seen as
 pseudo-instruments in the regression and their effect is to lessen the potential problems of 
endogeneity and simultaneity.     12
 
An alternative measure of corruption is the corruption perception index (CPI). The CPI 
measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption, with a higher score indicating lower 
corruption. We are unable to use this measure for the entire sample period because it is only 
available from 1995 and it is not until 1998 that it is available for the majority of countries in 
the region. We include the CPI in a fixed effects equation using annual observations for all 
variables (where data is available) over the period 1995-2003. The relevant dependent 
variable is the Gini coefficient and the results are presented in Table 7. The corruption 
variable (cpi) has the correct (positive) sign (as corruption falls, inequality rises) and it is 
bordering on being significant at the 10 per cent level.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the income inequality-corruption relationship in Latin America. The 
results show that corruption and inequality are inversely related: corruption contributes to 
reducing inequality and may be perceived as a means of pro poor redistribution. The finding 
of an inverse relationship between corruption and inequality, while at odds with results from 
other empirical studies, makes sense in Latin America for a number of reasons. First, there is 
a large informal sector in many Latin American countries. The informal sector provides jobs 
and a source of income for people who are among the poorest in society. Many of these 
people lack the personal characteristics required to find work in the formal economy, while 
discrimination and institutional barriers also inhibit work opportunities. As corruption is 
reduced business becomes more formal: operational costs rise, profits are reduced and jobs 
are lost. Second, corruption may be seen as a price worth paying for lower inequality. The 
provision of certain government projects, while fostering corruption, serves to improve the 
welfare of the very poor. Well-intentioned policy makers are hesitant to reduce or eliminate 
corrupt programmes because this is often the only way to improve the condition of the poor. 
A third reason, and one which merits additional research, is the possibility that as corruption 
becomes more organised the provision of some government goods may improve, thus 
contributing to improving the well being of the poor.  
 
The implication for policy of our key finding is that countries plagued by inequality may 
benefit from allowing corruption to grow. However, this seems a risky interpretation. If 
corruption is allowed to grow, countries may end up later on with an even weaker institutional 
framework, and so end up in a bad governance/low productivity trap. Furthermore, a   13
significant proportion of the Latin American labour market is unregulated with many workers 
(adults and children
20) facing exploitation and dangerous working conditions. Low 
productivity and the absence of social protection characterise the informal sector and letting 
corruption grow would exacerbate this situation.  
 
A safer way of tackling inequality in Latin America is to encourage countries to fight 
corruption and at the same time adopt policies that directly promote the productivity of the 
poorest groups. In this way, if anti-corruption measures were to make inequality worse the 
harm could be offset by improvements in the human capital development of those in the 
lowest income quintile. Institutional reform programmes combined with action that helps the 
poor acquire skills and maintain good health seems a better way forward.       
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Table 1: Inequality in Latin America (average Gini coefficient) 
Country  1982-85 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97  1998-2002 
Argentina  40.98 41.55 45.60 45.83  47.90 
Bolivia    51.50 53.50 51.41  60.10 
Brazil  57.23 58.75 61.83 59.03  60.30 
Chile  54.53 55.11 55.65 53.00  56.50 
Columbia 55.75    55.05  58.29  57.40 
Costa Rica  46.90    48.13  48.15  48.68 
Dominican  Republic    45.20 51.50 51.60  48.90 
Ecuador   44.40    56.07  56.97 
Guatemala   56.00  55.30    54.90 
Honduras    54.80 55.33 55.05  53.90 
Jamaica     54.45  59.40  56.75 
Mexico    50.60 53.10 54.55  54.90 
Nicaragua       53.90  54.30 
Panama 47.60    57.75  56.80  57.20 
Peru     50.90  54.70  50.12 
Paraguay 45.10    39.80  55.85  55.40 
El Salvador      47.10  50.15  53.60 
Uruguay  42.10 40.13 41.14 43.17  43.79 
Venezuela  45.40 46.23 44.29 44.01  47.91 
        
Latin  America  (19)  48.40 49.48 51.20 52.83  53.66 
Source: UNU-WIDER (2005).   19
Table 2: Corruption in Latin America  
Country  1982-85 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97  1998-2002 
Argentina 4  4  3.75  2.75  2.63 
Bolivia  1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
Brazil 4  4  4  3.0  2.73 
Chile 3  3  3  3  4 
Colombia 3  3  3  3  1.75 
Costa Rica  5  5  5  5  4.5 
Dominican  Republic  3  3  3 3.5 4 
Ecuador 3  3  3  3  3.25 
Guatemala 2  2  2  2  4 
Honduras 2  2  2  2  1.88 
Jamaica  2  2  2 2.75 3 
Mexico 3  3  3  3  2.5 
Nicaragua  3  5  5 4.75 4 
Panama 2  2  2  2  2 
Peru 2  3  3  3  3 
Paraguay 1  0.25  1.5  2.25  2 
El  Salvador  2  2 2.25 3 3.75 
Uruguay 3  3  3  3  3 
Venezuela 3  3  3  3  3 
       
Latin  America  (19)  2.74 2.83 2.93 3.01 3.09 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); Published by the PRS Group (2003) 
Corruption index is from 0 (high) to 6 (low).   20
Table 3: Estimation results (Gini coefficient) 
Dependent variable: Gini 
coefficient 
1 2  3  4 
        
lgdp    -100.812  -39.460  -97.718  -5.094 
 [0.254]  [0.581]  [0.157]  [0.148] 
lgdp
2  5.419 1.853  5.377   
 [0.283]  [0.639]  [0.165]   
primary -0.114**  -0.137**  -0.133*  -0.133** 
 [0.040]  [0.051]  [0.065]  [0.048] 
secondary 0.123**  0.087*  0.081*  0.099* 
 [0.024]  [0.091]  [0.092]  [0.074] 
aggdp   -0.111     
   [0.415]     
m2gdp     0.195**  0.136*   
   [0.030]  [0.0461]   
dcps 0.086**      0.091** 
 [0.027]      [0.044] 
trade 0.166***  0.123**  0.224***  0.167*** 
 [0.000]  [0.024]  [0.000]  [0.003] 
inflation   0.000     
   [0.603]     
natres   0.262  0.118   
   [0.235]  [0.372]   
land 36.049**  31.655    31.361* 
 [0.035]  [0.223]    [0.077] 
corrupt 1.566**  1.424**  2.530**  1.831*** 
 [0.024]  [0.026]  [0.051]  [0.007] 
corrupt*trade     -0.026*   
     [0.093]   
trade*natres   -0.0043     
   (0.284)     
corrupt*priv       -0.216* 
       [0.057] 
fdi   0.152     
   [0.109]     
priv   0.180    0.705* 
   [0.222]    [0.090] 
Constant 479.160  246.166  465.830  53.807 
 [0.214]  [0.443]  [0.110]  [0.1794] 
F- test  23.366  24.103  23.3657  21.895 
(p-value) [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Hausman test  15.803  24.167  24.198  16.901 
(p-value)   (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.0040)  [0.034] 
Adjusted R
2  0.527 0.549  0.514  0.539 
Number of observations  70  73  70  66 
P values are in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.       
Fixed effects not reported.   21
Table 4: Estimation results (Quintile 1)  
Dependent variable: share of the 







        
lgdp    24.653  17.450  0.414  16.349 
 [0.279]  [0.314]  [0.599]  [0.357] 
lgdp
2  -1.343 -0.948    -0.900 
 [0.400]  [0.337]    [0382] 
primary 0.054***  0.019**  0.022***  0.039** 
 [0.001]  [0.031]  [0.009]  [0.036] 
secondary -0.054***  -0.012    -0.040** 
 [0.001]  [0.493]    [0.033] 
aggdp   0.116**     
   [0.051]     
m2gdp     -0.024*  -0.020*   
   [0.057]  [0.072]   
dcps -0.019***      -0.021*** 
 [0.000]      [0.003] 
trade -0.022**  0.045    -0.009 
 [0.037]  [0.556]    [0.433] 
inflation   -0.000     
   [0.614]     
natres -0.051**  -0.061  -0.102**   
 [0.051]  [0.128]  [0.025]   
land   -10.636***    -15.721*** 
   [0.001]    [0.009] 
corrupt -0.514**  -0.555**  -0.595**  -0.781** 
 [0.031]  [0.051]  [0.048]  [0.011] 
corrupt*trade     -0.005   
     [0.166]   
trade*natres   0.001     
   [0.500]     
corrupt*priv       0.016 
       [0.158] 
fdi   -0.027  -0.035*   
   [0.179]  [0.095]   
priv   -0.048  -0.0733**  -0.321** 
   [0.217]  [0.024]  [0.019] 
Constant -107.387  -67.568  7.709  -56.015 
 [0.178]  [0.154]  [0.386]  [0.262] 
F- test  25.151  21.634  28.160  26.523 
(p-value) [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Hausman test  39.70  18.91  20.85  33.62 
(p-value)   [0.003]  [0.041]  [0.013]  [0.000] 
Adjusted R
2  0.501 0.595  0.523  0.523 
Number of observations  64  63  64  64 
P values are in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.       
Fixed effects not reported. 
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lgdp    -88.733  -55.348  31.335  19.645 
 [0.279]  [0.401]  [0.204]  [0.300] 
lgdp
2
  4.676 2.857 -1.725  -1.045 
 [0.314]  [0.445]  [0.221]  [0.338] 
primary  -0.140** -0.097*  0.050***  0.018* 
 [0.052]  [0.087]  [0.008]  [0.108] 
secondary  0.138***  -0.060***   
 [0.006]    [0.002]   
aggdp   -0.616*    0.013** 
   [0.106]    [0.046] 
m2gdp   0.134*    -0.022* 
   [0.107]    [0.095] 
dcps  0.081**  -0.018**   
 [0.023]    [0.019]   
trade  0.172*** 0.132**  -0.020**   
 [0.002]  [0.042]  [0.026]   
inflation   -0.000    -0.000 
   [0.793]    [0.826] 
natres   0.170  -0.072**  -0.085* 
   [0.294]  [0.088]  [0.097] 
land  38.132** 25.587     
 [0.015]  [0.167]     
corrupt  1.432* 1.221** -0.719**  -0.878*** 
 [0.053]  [0.061]  [0.013]  [0.011] 
land   29.880     
   [0.165]     
fdi   0.166    -0.036** 
   [0.096]    [0.038] 
priv   0.174    -0.073* 
   [0.182]    [0.092] 
Constant 325.271  283.196  -135.870  -86.750 
 [0.159]  [0.56]  [0.202]  [0.288] 
F- test  21.68  24.661  18.63  22.87 
(p-value) [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Hausman test  14.78  19.32  19.35  20.32 
(p-value)   [0.029]  [0.032]  [0.0072]  [0.009] 
Adj R
2  0.54 0.57  0.52  0.51 
Number of 
observations 
52 51  51  48 
P values are in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.       
Fixed effects not reported. 
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Table 6: Estimation results (adjusted Gini coefficient) 
Dependent variable: Unbounded Gini 
coefficient  
1 2 
    
lgdp    -3.250  -3.081 
 [0.222]  [0.252] 
lgdp
2  0.176 0.169 
 [0.234]  [0.269] 
primary -0.0055**  -0.006** 
 [0.037]  [0.023] 
secondary 0.002**  0.005** 
 [0.083]  [0.047] 
aggdp   -0.001 
   [0.941] 
m2gdp   0.005*   
 [0.063]   
dcps   0.004** 
   [0.027] 
trade 0.007***  0.006*** 
 [0.002]  [0.001] 
inflation   0.000 
   [0.589] 
natres 0.010*  0.008 
 [0.053]  [0.333] 
land 1.021**  1.536** 
 [0.021]  [0.033] 
corrupt 0.066**  0.067** 
 [0.052]  [0.025] 
fdi   -0.002 
   [0.321] 
priv   0.006 
   [0.272] 
Constant 13.735  19.033 
 [0.251]  [0.244] 
F- test  21.312  19.234 
(p-value) [0.000]  [0.000] 
Hausman test  17.514  16.757 
(p-value)   (0.0235)  (0.0431) 
Adjusted R
2  0.521 0.536 
Number of observations  66  70 
P values are in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.       
Fixed effects not reported.   24
Table 7: Estimation results (alternative measure of corruption) 
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient   1  2  3 
      
lgdp    9.471  7.225  11.600 
 [0.754]  [0.709]  [0.423] 
lgdp
2  -0.460    
 [0.745]     
primary -0.109**  -0.280**  -0.381** 
 [0.034]  [0.053]  [0.013] 
secondary   0.223**  0.274*** 
   [0.017]  [0.001] 
aggdp   -1.953***  2.207*** 
   [0.008]  [0.000] 
m2gdp     0.051   
   [0.120]   
dcps     0.031 
     [0.353] 
trade 0.066  0.285  0.263 
 [0.280]  [0.117]  [0.142] 
inflation   -0.025   
   [0.765]   
natres 0.815     
 [0.020]     
land -21.037     
 [0.3317]     
cpi 0.840  1.785  3.024 
 [0.120]  [0.105]  [0.112] 
fdi 0.073     
 [0.003]     
priv 0.193     
 [0.132]     
Constant 28.321  30.813  46.929 
 [0.963]  [0.816]  [0.712] 
F- test  18.32  21.67  19.63 
(p-value) [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Hausman test  18.75  15.29  17.25 
(p-value)   (0.027)  (0.033)  (0.029) 
Adjusted R
2  0.51 0.46  0.44 
Number of observations  54  54  48 
P values are in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.       
Fixed effects not reported. 
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